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Kant: the Duty to Promote International Peace
and Political Intervention
Harry Van der Linden, Indianapolis
Kant argues that it is the duty of humanity to strive for an enduring peace
between the nations. For Kant, political progress within each nation is essential
to realizing lasting peace, and so one would expect him to view political intervention-defined as coercive interference by one nation, or some of its citizens,
with the affairs of another nation in order to bring about political improvements
in that nation-as justified in some cases.! Kant, however, explicitly rejects all
intervention by force, and some aspects of his work support an unqualified
prohibition of political intervention. In this paper I will exarrline on which
grounds, stated or inferred, Kant's practical philosophy upholds the absolute
prohibition of political intervention, and conclude that, although these grounds
are inadequate, they have the merit of pointing to important restrictions on justified political intervention.
The Duty to Promote International Peace
The content of this duty depends on how international peace can be realized. In To Perpetual Peace, Kant argues that the emergence of republican
states (representative democracies) is crucial for realizing peace: "[IfJ a powerful and enlightened people should form a republic ... , it will provide a focal
point for a federal association among other nations that will join it in order to
guarantee a state of peace among nations ... , and through several associations of
this sort such a federation can extend further and further.,,2 Perpetual peace will
then be realized when all nations have together formed a federation of states,
which Kant further explicates as a union of republican states in which each
state has abolished its standing army, voluntarily upholds the sovereignty of all
other nations, and is hospitable to visitors who seek to trade or to exchange
ideas. On Kant's account, republican states can function as focal points of
peace because in these states "the consent of the citizenry is required in order to
determine whether or not there will be war, [and] it is natural that they consider
all its calamities before committing themselves to so risky a game.,,3 Kant continues to argue that despotic states, to the contrary, easily go the war because
their rulers need no public consent and usually can avoid the ravages of war .
.More broadly, Kant holds that since republican states, unlike undemocratic
states, allow, and even promote, the "public use of reason," they facilitate the
moral and political enlightenment of their citizens and thus are more likely to
-Proceedings of the Eighth International Kant Congress, Memphis 1995, vol. II.
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seek lasting peace. 4 Granted Kant's view that democracy is a crucial contributing factor to international peace, 5 it seems to follow that the duty to promote
peace significantly includes the duty to promote the republican ideal, both
within one's own nation and in foreign nations.
Kant himself explicitly draws this inference regarding the duty to promote
the republican ideal within one's own nation, even though he severely restricts
the stope of this duty by claiming that political change may not occur through
resistance and revolution, but must take place through gradual reform initiated
by existing rulers. 6 However, it is less clear whether Kant thought that we have
a duty to promote republicanism in foreign nations for the sake of peace. He
argues that a defeated "unjust enemy" may be required "to adopt a new constitution that by its nature will be unfavorable to the inclination for war." This
constitution is the republican constitution, and so this treatment of a defeated
state may be seen as an instance of the duty to promote republicanism in foreign nations for the sake of peace. 7 Kant does not provide other similar examples, but the duty can be given more Kantian content as follows. It accords with
Kant's view that wealthy nations and their citizens have a duty to assist developing nations in their endeavor to eliminate poverty, hunger, preventable dis. eases, and poor education; for the elimination of these ills removes
impediments to individual autonomy, and one aspect of the duty to respect
other humans as ends in themselves is to promote the conditions oftheir autonomy. 8 Improved conditions of autonomy facilitate political progress and thus
help the cause of peace. Hence, assistance in the struggle against poverty, hunger, and so forth, in developing countries may be seen as a way of satisfying the
duty to promote republicanism in foreign nations for the sake of peace. Nonetheless, Kant's ethics is too restrictive here because it supports the view that we
may never seek to promote peace by furthering republicanism in foreign nations
through political intervention.
Kant's Arguments Against Political Intervention
Preliminary Article 5 of To Perpetual Peace prohibits intervention: "No
nation shall forcibly (gewalttdtig) interfere with the constitution and government of another." In his explication of the Article, Kant suggests that just as
one may not coercively interfere with the immoral conduct of a person who
only sets a bad example, so it is wrong to coercively interfere with a foreign
state that does not harm other states but oppresses its own people. Rather, the
example of the oppressive government should be seen as a warning to other
nations not to commit the same injustices. Kant adds that foreign assistance to
one of the parties in an internal discord is justified only in the case of civil war;
for since the parties are in a "condition of anarchy," the assistance "to one of
the parties could not be regarded as interference by the other in its constitution.,,9 He concludes that, short of civil war, "a foreign power's interference
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'would violate the rights of an independent people struggling with its internal
ills. Doing this would be an obvious offense and would render the autonomy of
every nation insecure."
Considering the language of Preliminary Article 5 and the political conditions of Kant's time, it is likely that Kant thought of intervention only in terms
of military and other violent forms of intervention when he formulated the Article. Thus the Article may seem compatible with nonviolent forms of political
intervention, such as financial support for democratic opposition parties in a
foreign nation or trade sanctions aimed at improving its human rights record.
The problem with this claim is that Kant's explication of the Article commits
him to the prohibition of all intervention, including political intervention, because he maintains that the autonomy of all nations, oppressive or not, should
be respected, just as we must respect alike the autonomy of non-harming virtuous and immoral persons. For Kant, the only exception to the rule of respecting
state autonomy is that a nation injures, or poses a threat to, other states, and
then war may be warranted. I 0
This argument (a), that political intervention is wrong because states are
like moral persons with autonomy should be distinguished from Kant's immediately following and final argument (b), under Preliminary Article 5, that
adopting a policy of intervention for the sake of eliminating injustice is wrong
because it would lead to the bad consequence of making the "autonomy of every
nation insecure" (and, hence, lasting peace would become an illusion). Kant
does not address intervention in any detail elsewhere in his work, and so additional arguments that he might have held against political intervention must be
inferred from various aspects of his practical philosophy. The following three
arguments seem to be the most significant: (c) A central theme of Kant's ethics
is that we must mirror the ideal of the realm of ends in our moral actions. We
may infer that it is also his view that in working toward peace we must mirror
the ideal of the federation of states as the political foundation of the realm of
ends. In this federation, nonintervention is the rule, and so Kant's ethics seems
to imply that this rule must always guide our political conduct, irrespective of
whether intervention might at times lead to political improvements. (d) In To
Perpetual Peace, Kant warns that political change should not be pushed too
quickly. "Despotic moralists" make this mistake out of political inexperience
and enthusiasm for the ideal, and, typically, the overall result is repression for
the sake of the good and a worse political constitution. IIMoral pol iticians,lI to
the contrary, realize that change must come gradually. I I Proponents of political
intervention are like despotic moralists, seeking premature political change.
They fail to realize that when people in a foreign nation are ready for change
they can realize it by themselves, and that intervention will ultimately only
worsen the situation. (e) Kant rejects revolution and resistance for various rea-
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sons, and, since political interv~ntion commonly involves assistance· to populat'
resistance, it is also unjustified.
Objections to Kant's Arguments
Argument (a) is mistaken on Kant's own terms. Granted that it is wrong to
coercively try to change the immoral conduct of a person who does not inflict
harm on. you, it does not follow in analogy that all political intervention is
wrong. The crucial point is that not all states should be viewed as moral persons with autonomy. Kant claims that the state as moral person is constituted
by the social contract. In other words, the state as moral person emerges when
the people give up their lawless freedom in the state of nature and install the
rule of law, expressing their united will, i.e., the will of the state as moral person. This means that the state is justified, and should be viewed as a moral person with autonomy, only if the state accords with the united Will. 12 Thus, the
. more a government adopts laws and policies that cannot be seen as an expression of the united will-and, typically, this involves the more a government is
undemocratic-the less reason there is to treat the state with this government as
a moral person. Kant failed to draw this conclusion, perhaps because he could
not accept its implication that most governments of his time were not legitimate. At any rate, the logic of his view is that political intervention is only
wrong with respect to republican states, or approximations thereof, and may be
justified with regard to unjust states if it accords with the will of their people
. struggling for democracy. 13
Argument (b) is weak if based on the premise that it is not theoretically
possible to articulate a principle that legitimizes political. intervention in only
some cases. We should, therefore, assume that the point of the argument is the
practical slippery slope: in the real world of politics, political interventions justified by a limited principle will give rise to many unjustified interventions.
Accordingly, wise political theorists should publicly reject political intervention
altogether, even if they hold that it may be theoretically justified in some cases.
And wise politicians will not pursue intervention, even if they believe it justified in a given situation, fearing that it would trigger many immoral interventions by other nations.
The danger of escalation, I think, should be granted, especially when intervention involves violence. However, we should not forget the very serious costs
of an unconditional prohibition of political intervention, created by leaving oppressed people without any real international support. 14 These costs have tremendously increased since Kant's time, as the instruments of oppression have
become much more effective and destructive. So we must articulate a limited
principle of political intervention, and promote a corresponding practice, that
minimizes the risk of escalation. Some guidelines are that the intervention must
be essential for political success; that nonviolent intervention rather than mili-
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tary intervention should be chosen where it is at all effective; that the intervention should accord with the will of those on whose behalf it takes place; and
that the intervening agent should seek support for its action within the world
community.
Argument (c) concerns the problem of ethical rigorism. Kant rightly contends that we must uphold the ideal of the realm of ends in our moral conduct
in the sense that we should determine our moral rules from the perspective of
members (ideal legislators) of this realm. However, Kant at times wrongly denies that in deciding how these rules should guide our conduct we should take
into account that we are not acting in a world of ideal legislators. 15 Thus Kant
arrives at his rigoristic adherence to truth-telling, as exemplified in his infamous insistence that a servant may not lie about the whereabouts of his master
to the person at the door who seeks to kill his master. This ethical rigorism is
morally untenable even on Kant's own account; for by neglecting that one is
confronted with evil, one may become an instrument of this evi1. This would
violate Kant's duty of self-respect and also be contrary to his duty of mutual
aid. 16
.
The upshot is that it is similarly wrong to act as if all existing nations are
like republican states in the federation of nations and thus arrive at an absolute
prohibition of intervention. Just as we may need to lie in order to prevent great
harm to an individual, so political intervention may be justified in order to
counteract political oppression in a foreign nation. This does not mean, however, that we should not mirror the ideal in our conduct. Rather, in this context,
this moral demand should be interpreted to mean that we should continue to
strive for the ideal and not deny its moral validity through our actions. Kant's
view in The Metaphysics oj Morals on the rules of war is instructive here. He
does not claim that we must be unconditional pacifists, apparently rejecting the
reasoning that led up to his rigorism concerning truth-telling. 17 A defensive
war may be waged, but it should be waged "in accordance with principles that
always leave open the possibility of leaving the state of nature among
states ... and entering a rightful condition" (VI, 347/153). Wars, then, must not
undermine the possibility of future peace. Accordingly, Kant continues to argue
that wars may not aim at the extermination or subjugation of other people.
Plunder is also wrong, and in support of this claim Kant makes the important
observation that the people' do not wage war, but rather the state "through the
people" (VI, 348/154). Last, Kant emphasizes that assassins, poisoners, snipers, and the like, should not be used; for "such underhanded means ... would
destroy the trust requisite to establish a lasting peace in the future.,,18
In my view, political intervention should likewise aim at peace and not undermine trust as the very basis of the future federation of states. This underlines
the significance of the restrictions on justified inte~ention mentioned earlier.
Intervention must be based on the will of the people needing outside assistance;
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it should ideally be supported by many republican nations in the world com-'
munity; and it should be a last resort measure, especially when violence is involved. More generally, intervention directed against an oppressive government
should incorporate Kant's guideline concerning war that the target should not
be individuals but the state as it acts through them. 19
Argument (d) points to an additional restriction on justified political intervention. It should be acknowledged that intervention may lead to premature
change because, as the gradualist rightly claims, emancipation is a slow process
even in revolutionary periods. So it is important that intervention in general
aims at increased moral and political self-determination of the people on whose
behalf it takes place. Kant, however, is often too conservative in his gradualism. In the anti-revolution/resistance passages in his work, Kant assumes that
the people are only ready for change when it is initiated and gradually pursued
by their governments, and that any successful attempt on the side of the people
to force change temporarily involves a state of anarchy that is worse than any
government whatsoever. 20 Once this bleak vision of the capacity of selfdetermination of the people is adopted, political intervention must always appear to be politically unwise. Kant's historical location may have prevented him ,
from seeing that popular struggles may be well-organized and disciplined. Cer-·
tainly, external support of such struggles does not necessarily iead to premature
change; for the people may be ready for political change and, yet, their political
success may require intervention to counteract an otherwise too powerful oppressive government.
In response to argument (e), it may first of all be noted that Kant's rejection
of resistance and revolution does not commit him to prohibit all political intervention. After all, intervention might involve support for an aspiring demo-:cratic government against its internal opposition. Further, although it is not my
purpose here to examine all Kant's arguments against revolution and resistance
in any detail, it may be noted that most of these arguments are similar to his
objections to political intervention and involve similar weaknesses. My discussion of argument (d) illustrates the point. A second example concerns Kant's
claim that revolution and resistance are unjustified because their acceptance
'''would render all just constitutions insecure. ,,21 This argument can be refuted
along the same lines in which I have refuted argument (b): A defense of civil,
'disobedience, revolution under exceptional circumstances, and so on, does neither in theory nor in practice imply the consequences foreseen by Kant. A final.
example is Kant' sargument that revolution and resistance are self-contradictory practices in that they entail that the people wish to act as judges of their
own cause and, yet, :Q.ave given up the right to do so in the social contract. Kant
here makes the same mistake as in argument (a), namely, that any government"
no matter how oppressive, must be seen as an expression of the united will and;
hence, as a moral person. 22

-----
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Conclusion
Although Kant's arguments against revolution and resistance, on the one
hand, and political intervention, on the other hand, display similar weaknesses
in his practical philosophy, his rejection of political intervention poses lessserious problems for his work. One reason for this is that political intervention is
less essential in bringing about political progress than are revolution and resistance. Another reason is that Kant might have contradicted his condemnation
of all active resistance by predicting political progress on basis of the moral
enthusiasm that the French Revolution created among its spectators,23 whereas
a similar inconsistency cannot be found with regard to his rejection of intervention.
Still, Kant's proposal that we ought to seek international peace with all our
efforts is weakened by his prohibition of political intervention. To be sure, Kant
explicitly rejects only intervention by force, but several arguments in his work
commit him to an unqualified rejection of political intervention. This view is
unacceptable, especially for our own age. The greatly increased interdependence of all nations and people since Kant's time, together with the revolutionary developments in the means of communication and the increased effectiveness and destructiveness of oppressive governments, have changed the
political, moral, and economic significance of national boundaries, making
political intervention more viable, urgent, diverse in its forms, and justified.
Yet, I hope to have shown that the arguments in Kant's work against intervention have the merit of pointing to important restrictions on justified political
intervention. A final restriction needs to be mentioned. In To Perpetual Peace,
Kant passionately condemned the practice of hiring out troops to other nations
because the soldiers "are used and wasted as mere objects to be manipulated at
will" (VIII, 3441108). Moreover, he argued that "paying men to kill or to be
killed appears to use them as mere machines and tools in the hands of another
(the nation)" (VIII, 345/108). Similar remarks apply to political interventions
that do not accord with the free will of those who execute them.

Notes
1. Political mtervention, as I h~ve defined it, is only a subclass of intervention. In the broader definition, the
purpose of intervention is left open. My definition (and its later explication) has profited from discussions ofthe
. broader concept in Charles R Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1979), pp. 72-74; Jeff McMahan, "The Ethics of International Intervention," in Anthony Ellis,
ed., Ethics and International Relations (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1986), pp. 24-28; and, Mark
R Wicc1air, "Human Rights and Intervention," in Peter G. Brown imd Douglas MacLean, eds., Human Rights
and U.S. Foreign Policy (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1979), pp. 142~144.
2. To Perpetual Peace, VIII, 356/117. In all citations of Kant's writings, the first number refers to the
volume number ofthe "Akadernie-Ausgabe" ofhis complete works, the second number refers to the page
number ofthis edition, and the third number refers to the page number ofthe English translation used. I have
used the following translations: Mary Gregor, TheMetaphysics a/Morals (Cambridge: Cambridge University
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Press, 1991); Ted Humphrey, Perpetual Peace and Other Essays on Politics, History, and Morals
(Indianapolis: Hackett, 1983), for translations of "Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Intent," "On
fue Proverb: That May be True in Theory, But Is of No Practical Use," and To Perpetual Peace: A
Philosophical Sketch; Werner S. Pluhar, Critique ofJudgment (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987); and Hans Reiss,
Kant's Political Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), for H. B. Nisbet's translation of"A
Renewed Attempt to Answer fue Question: Is the Human Race Continually Improving?", Part II of The Contest
ofFaculties.
3. To Perpetual Peace, VIII, 351/113. At some places Kant suggests that international peace is a precondition for the emergence of republican states. See fue Seventh Thesis of "Idea for a Universal History with a
Cosmopolitan lntent," VIII, 24/34, which states that "[t]he problem of establishing a perfect civil constitution
depends on the problem oflaw-governed external relations among nations and cannot be solved unless fue latter
is." See also Critique ofJudgment, V, 432/320. There is no serious inconsistency here. His view should be
modified and made consistent as follows: The emergence of republican states is essential to fue realization of
lasting peace, but war threatens fue stability of republican states, and steps toward peace promote fue formation
offuese states.
4. How the public use of reason may contribute to peace (in various areas ofhuman life) is a central topic of
Hans Saner, Kant's Political Thought, translated by E. B. Ashton (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1973). Kant's own peace proposal is meant to contribute to the enlightenment offue citizens and fuus to the
cause of peace. See the Ninth Thesis of "Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Intent." However,
Kant assigns a greater role to self-interest rather than to moral motives in bringing humanity cIoserto lasting
peace.
5. In "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs," Michael W. Doyle shows in support of Kant's view
that secure liberal democracies during the past two centuries have not engaged in war with one another, even
though they have fought frequently with nonliberal states. See Philosophy & Public Affairs 12 (1983): 205-235
and 323-353, pp. 213 and 225:if. The fact that liberal states have fought with nonliberal states for imperialistic
reasons shows that lasting peace requires both democracy and intemational economic justice. Kant anticipated
fuis latter point in his biting criticisms of European colonialism See To Perpetual Peace, VIII, 358-59/119, and
The Metaphysics ofMorals, VI, 353/159. It may further be noted that the ideal of enlightened citizens requires a
more extensive democratization of society than Kant envisioned This is not only so because Kant limited fue
right to vote to economically independent males, but also because it has become clear that modern representative
dernocracies, as more consistellt embodiments of his republican ideal, have not realized widespread political
participation and debate.
6. See "A Renewed Attempt to Answer the Question: Is the Human Race Continually Improving?", where
Kant claims that the republican constitution "is the best qualified of all to keep out war, [and] [t]hus it is our duty
to enter into a constitution ofthis kind" (VII, 91/187). That this duty requires gradual reform undertaken by
eXisting governments rather than popular struggle is, for example, stated by Kant in The Metaphysics of Morals,
VI, 355/161.
7. See TheMetaphysics ofMorals, VI, 349-5051156. The imposition of a republican constitution should
not be seen as an instance of political intervention After all, the victorious nation temporarily has political/legal.
control over the defeated nation. The liberalization ofJapan and Germany after the Second WorId War may be
seen as an example of imposed republicanization
8. Cf Onora O'Neill, "Ending World Hunger/' Ch. 7 of Tom Regan, ed.,Matters ofLife and Death (New
York: McGraw-HilI, 1993).
9. To Perpetual Peace, VIII, 346/109. Although I have my doubts about Kant's argument here, I agree
with his view that assistance to a party in civil war should not be viewed as a form of intervention. Certainly, the
moral issues·in standard cases of intervention and assistance to a party in civil war are not fue same. However, on
a broader account ofintervention, one might argue that Kant here is stating an exception to the rule of
nonintervention. On this account, my concem is to contest that he does not make more exceptions.
10. See TheMetaphysics ofMorals, par. 56. Accordingly, it is a mistake to claim, as Carl Joachim
Friedrich does in Inevitable Peace (Cambridge: Harvard Urnversity Press, 1948), p. 178, that Kant might have
held that the prohibition of intervention does not apply when a nation is made undemocratic by a coup d' etat.
This also follows from Kant's view that Preliminary Articles 1, 5, and 6 formulate strict prohibitions that hold
"regardless ofthe circumstances" (To Perpetual Peace, VIII, 347/110).
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11. See To Perpetual Peace, VIII, 372-73/128-29. For a more detailed discussion, see my Kantian Ethics
and Socialism (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1988), pp. 170-72. I also elaborate on these pages, and on pp. 267-68, my
view of gradualism as set forth in my later discussion of argument (d).
12. In further support ofthis view, it may be noted that it is a mistake to view a state that does not harm
other states but oppresses its own people as similar to a person who does not inflict harm on others but acts
immorally. After all, the immoral person only harms himself, but the oppressive state harms its own citizens.
13. Cf Femando R. Tes6n, "'The Kantian Theory ofIntemational Law," Columbia Law Review 92
(1992): 53-102, pp. 92-93. Tes6n is one ofthe very few commentators on Kant's peace proposal who goes
beyond merely mentioning his rejection of intervention. Tes6n's critical discussion is limited to argument (a).
Another brief discussion can be found in Howard Williams, Kant's Political Philosophy (Oxford: Basil
Blackwell, 1983), pp. 246-247. Howard touches on argument (d). Beitz, Political Theory and International
Relations, pp. 75fE, and McMahan, "The Ethics ofIntemational Intervention," pp. 29fE, refute modem variants
of Kant's "autonomy" argument against intervention. I have profited from their discussions. Beitz also briefly
discusses Kant's view (p. 82).
14. Cf McMahan, "The Ethics of Intervention," p. 44.
15. Cf Thomas E. Hill, Jr., Dignity and Practical Reason in Kant's Moral Theory (Ithaca: Comell
University Press, 1992), p. 66.
16. See Christine M. Korsgaard, "The Right to Lie: Kant on Dealing with Evil," Philosophy & Public
Affairs 15 (1986): 325-349, p. 340.
17. My analysis here is indebted to Korsgaard, "The Right to Lie," p. 349.
18. TheMetaphysics o/Morals, VI, 347/154. The same point is made in Preliminary Article 6 of To
Perpetual Peace. Preliminary Article 1 indicates that Kant also held that the conclusion of war in a peace treaty
must be consistent with the future ideal ofthe federation of states.
19. Thomas Nagel offers an excellent explication ofthis idea (with regard to war) in his classic "War and
Massacre," Philosophy & Public Affairs 1 (1972): 123-144.
20. See "On the Proverb: That May be True in Theory, But Is ofNo Practical Use," VIII, 303n./81n. See
also ToPerpetualPeace, VIII, 373n./129n.
21. See "On the Proverb: That May be True in Theory, But Is of No Practical Use," VIII, 301/80.
22. ·The final argument against revolution and resistance is set forth in The Metaphysics o/Morals, VI,
320-322/131-33. My criticisms here of Kant's rejection of revolution and resistance are elaborated inKantian
Ethics and SOCialism, pp. 180-184.
23. Whether Kant is indeed inconsistent here remains a matter of ongoing debate. The strongest recent case
against the claim of inconsistency is made by Peter P. Nicholson, "Kant, Revolutions and History," in Howard
.Lloyd Williams, ed, Essays on Kant's PoliticalPhilosophy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992).
Nicholson rightly argues that Kant explicated the enthusiasm ofthe spectators as a sign that people are morally
concemed with republicanism and the prevention of war, Accordingly, Kant's mere support ofthis enthusiasm
does not commit him to supporting revolutionary change. However, Nicholson fails to elaborate on how political
progress can be predicted on basis ofthese moral concerns among the people; Kant's view is that political
progress can be predicted because sooner or later "favorable circumstances" will emerge in which these moral
concerns will lead to "renewed attempts ofthe same kind as before" [i.e., the French Revolution]. See "A
Renewed Attemptto Answer the Question: Is the Human Race Continually Improving?", VII, 88/185. Kant's
prediction of progress, then, is incompatible with his condemnation of revolution and resistance. IfKant had
predicted progress on basis of a moral enthusiasm ofthe rulers ofhis time for the French Revolution, he would
have been consistent But, of course, these rulers displayed the very opposite reaction.

